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in Japan's policy. The United States besides being the originator of the Open-Door Policy is a party to several international agreements guaranteeing the independence of China. Japan's demands, therefore, affect not only our commercial interests but also our honor as a nation.

There are no serious errors in the book, with the exception of Baron Riedesel's name, which is incorrectly given (p. 53) as "Leadse". Mr. Jones has apparently fallen into this error by getting the name from the Japanese who are apt to confuse the letters R and L. Baron Riedesel, second secretary of the German Legation in Peking, was the first German to fall at Tsingtau. He was a descendant of the Baron Riedesel who commanded the Hessians in our Revolutionary War. Like his famous ancestor, who paid such a glowing tribute to the American soldiers who captured him, Riedesel of Tsingtau had a great admiration for Americans and was exceedingly popular in the American community in Peking. He was a true knight "without fear or reproach". Those of us who knew him there and admired him for his knightly qualities will regret that his name was distorted almost beyond recognition in the only book that chronicles the manner of his death.

LUTHER ANDERSON.

BOOKS OF AMERICAN HISTORY

The Military Unpreparedness of the United States: a History of American Land Forces from Colonial Times until June 1, 1915.

By FREDERIC LOUIS HUIDEKOPER. With an introduction by Major-General LEONARD WOOD, M.H., Former Chief of Staff of the United States Army. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1915. Pp. xvi, 735.)

MR. HUIDEKOPER's book concerns a question of the hour and advocates a specific solution with some vigor. Yet it is historical in the sense that it sketches the history of the United States army from the time of the War of Independence down to the present. So far as it goes this sketch is sufficiently correct, but it does not go nearly far enough and always remains on the surface.

The author's endeavor is to demonstrate that waste and inefficiency have always characterized the military policy of this country; and he amply proves his case. He shows clearly that the marvel of Washington's success lay rather in his overcoming the ineptitude of Congress than in his dealing with the skill and numbers of the enemy. From that day to this there has been no very striking improvement. Our efforts during the Civil War, which Mr. Huidekoper carefully tabulates, were of an immense character, threatening national solvency for many years after. Yet the Confederacy was a weak state, with few resources for conducting a military struggle and with an army that would have been helpless against a trained force.

Where we think the author falls short is in his apparent inability to relate American military efforts to the growth of industrialism and the development of the military art as a general matter during the nineteenth century. To be more specific, he states: "At the end of the War of the Rebellion the volunteers had acquired a training which made them comparable to any armies that have ever existed." Leaving on one side what may be dismissed from this statement as merely rhetorical exaggeration, it yet reflects one of the most rooted of our popular misconceptions as to the conduct of war, and especially of the Civil War. It is the false foundation on which repose the most popular and most flimsy of our present-day defense schemes. Let us consider the question from some way back.

General Upton, on whose book, *The Military Policy of the United States*, Mr. Huidekoper has based his own, is noteworthy in our Civil War as one of the very few officers in the army who ever gave serious consideration to tactical formations, though he did not, as might indeed have been expected, achieve any very striking results. And in the vast mass of literature produced by the officers of the two armies after the war was over, Upton's book holds a solitary distinction as virtually the only one that treats warfare as though it might be a matter for scientific or professional study. This in itself speaks volumes, and the reason is obvious enough. The armies were controlled by men who were not scientifically or professionally trained. And even Mr. Huidekoper, who has devoted much of his time to military studies and should know better, has not discovered that the men of the Civil War did not know how to perform the two essential functions of the commander of troops, which are, first, to move them; second, to employ them tactically. The first of these rudimentary arts they picked up after a couple of years or more of painful experience; the second they learned only in the limited sense imposed by the practical but weak methods of their opponents. In other words, and not to develop this topic at too great length, Mr. Huidekoper virtually ignores the lack of tactical science and of the education of the staff and higher command among the items making up the defencelessness of this country. Yet it is probably the gravest item; and even Mr. Huidekoper at bottom suspects it, for in alluding to the recent administration of our military affairs he goes so far as to say that in our army "the system is one of promotion by senility". This is a little hard. Our generals have been more sinned against than sinning; and if they are untrained in the higher branches of their profession it is the fault of Congress and not theirs.

Notwithstanding its obvious deficiencies on the theoretical side, we must be grateful to Mr. Huidekoper for a useful compendium of the consistent failings of our military administration. It reads very much like some of the blackest pages in the history of the fall of the Bourbons in France. We hope that the compilers of our school texts may turn to this book for a little of the guidance in military matters that they seriously need.